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This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of 
both banks' required capital-asset  ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries 
forbids, banks' investments in equity to a certain proportion of each firm's capital. There are 
two sources of moral hazard in the model:  one between the bank and the provider of  deposit 
insurance, and the other between  the bank  and the entrepreneur who demands funds to 
finance an investment project.  Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation 
irnproves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving.  Equity regulation is never 
Pareto-improving  and does not increase the bank's stability. 
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The risk-shifting  effect caused by deposit insurance, when the insurance preiniuin does not 
reflect banks' risk, has long been recognized.'  It is usually identified by the banks' decision 
to finance risky instead of safe investment projects.  Nonetheless, regulators have responded 
not by modifying the deposit insurance contract, but instead by introducing a wide range 
of restrictions on banks7  activities designed to limit their motivation and ability to choose 
very  risky asset portfolios.  Although  these restrictions  tend to vary  substantially across 
countries, there are some common patterns, such as regulations on banks! capital and on 
their investments in the equity of  nonfinancial firms. 
The 1987 Basle Agreement on Capital Standards, reached by the GI0 countries, and the 
1993 introduction by the European Community of the Banks' Own Funds and the Solvency 
Ratio Directives,  both in line with the Basle Agreement, were the main regulations  that 
implemented the international harmonization of capital requirements." 
With respect  to banks7 investments in the equity of  nonfinancial firms, of  particular 
interest is the regulation that limits each of these investments to a certain percentage either 
of the firm's capital or of its voting rights.3  For example, this limit is 50 percent in Norway; 
25 percent  in Portugal; 10 percent  in Canada and Finland; 5 percent in Belgium, Japan, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden; and zero percent in the United States, because U.S.  commer- 
cial banks are not allowed  to invest in equity.  Germany and Switzerland  are examples of 
countries where banks7  investments in equity are not limited by that form of regulation. 
The objective of  this paper is  to study the efficiency  and welfare implications of  both 
'Kareken  and Wallace (1978) and Dothan and Williams  (1980) are examples of  works  that have used 
state preference models to prove this result; Merton (1977, 1978) pioneered the use of  options to show it. 
'For  a presentation of  the capital regulations, see Cordell and King (1992). 
31n  most  countries,  such investments are also  subject  to the  prudential limits of  the banks'  capital 
regulation.  This regulation, in general, limits these investments to a certain percentage of  the bank's capital. 
For a characterization of these limits in the OECD countries, see Pecchioli (1987) and Schuijer (1992). 
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banks' stability and on the contracts they use to finance firms. 
This study is conducted in  an intermediation inodel where banks are the only source 
of  external funds to firms.  A crucial feature of  the model is the existence of  two sources 
of  moral hazard.  One is in the relationship between  the bank and the provider of  deposit 
insurance, because the bank assunles that the insurance premium it pays does not reflect 
the risk of  its assets.  The other source of  moral hazard is in the relationship between  the 
bank and the entrepreneur (firm) who demands funding, because the investment's  return 
depends on the entrepreneur's effort, which is not observable.  Furthermore, because one 
of  the regulations studied here involves banks' investments in  equity, the project held  by 
the entrepreneur is designed so that the optimal financing contract can be replicated by a 
(unique) combination of  debt and equity. 
In  this model, the bank must choose its capital structure and the contract it uses  to 
finance the entrepreneur.  As  a result, the risk-shifting  effect due to deposit insurance is 
translated here not in the bank's decision to  finance risky instead of  safe investment projects, 
as is common in the literature, but in its choice of a contract that motivates the entrepreneur 
to adopt a riskier behavior, which in turn increases the risk of  the bank's  assets. Therefore, 
the firm's  capital structure becomes dependent on  the conditions under which  the bank 
operates, namely the presence of regulations and the existence of deposit insurance. 
Using this framework, the paper shows that an increase in  the required  capital-asset 
ratio improves the bank's  stability, can be Pareto-improving,  and in some cases, can even 
increase the model's  efficiency, in the sense of  making its solution closer to the first-best 
outcome.  This policy has a cost, because it forces the bank to use relatively more of  its 
most expensive source of  funding (capital).  However,  it  also has a  positive  effect.  By 
increasing what the bank's equityholders have at stake in case of  bankruptcy, an increase in 
the required capital-asset  ratio decreases the bank's incentives to motivate risky behavior 
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of the contract used by the bank that is more risk-motivating  (debt). As a consequence, the 
bank's risk of failure declines, which in turn reduces the inoral hazard costs due to deposit 
insurance. 
Soine of  these results have not been  captured by  studies of  banks' capital regulation, 
because the approach usually  adopted does not  endogenize  the financing contracts,  and 
because the inain focus has been to study the implications of  that regulation on banks' risk. 
Examples of the research conducted in this area are Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santoinero 
(1980)' Kim and Santomero (1988), Furlong and Keeley (1989)' Keeley and Furlong (1990), 
Rochet (1992), and Campbell, Chan, and Marino (1992). 
With respect to the equity investinent regulation, we will see that the introduction of  a 
liinit on the percentage of  the firm's  capital that a bank can hold has mixed effects on the 
efficiency of the model, does not increase the bank's stability, and is never Pareto-improving. 
Furthermore, we  will see that it is even possible to observe an increase in the bank's  risk 
of failure due to the introduction of  this form of  regulation. The intuition for these results 
is based on the following argument:  Limiting the bank's  ability to finance a firm through 
an equity contract forces the bank to siinultaneously supply part of  the funds needed  by 
the firin through a different financial instrument that might be more risk-motivating  than 
equity.  As a result, the gains in stability that might occur from the reduction of  the bank's 
stake in the capital of  the firm are offset, and in some cases outweighed, by  the risk effect 
of the financial instrument that the bank uses instead to finance the firm. 
Regulations on  banks'  investments in equity have not been a pri~ne  candidate for re- 
search.  In work  done independently, John, John,  and Saunders (1994)  show  that when 
the bank  cannot  control the firm's  investment decisions,  the efficiency of  the investment 
is higher and the bank's  risk is lower if  the bank uses equity in  conjunction with debt to 
finance the firm.  However, when  the bank can veto the firm's  investment decisions, there 
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risk. 
When  the bank  cannot  control the firm's investment  decisions,  both  the John  et al. 
model and the model presented here produce the same conclusion:  Limiting or forbidding 
the bank to finance a firrn using equity in addition to debt deteriorates both the investment's 
efficiency and the bank's  risk  (John et al.  rely on the variance of  the bank's  cash flows as 
their measure of  risk, while here this tneasure is given by the bank's probability of  failure). 
Despite the conlmon  assumption  that banks are the only  source of  external funds to 
firms, there are important differences between the two approaches.  For example, the model 
adopted here incorporates the bank's  capital structure and the existence of  deposit insur- 
ance, both of  which are absent from their model. This allows the study of  the banks' capital 
and equity investment  regulations in the same framework, which  also happens to sustain 
the optimality of  debt and equity contracts. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 introduces the model, characterizes the first- 
and second-best  solutions, and shows the optimality of  debt and equity contracts. Section 
3 studies the capital and equity investment  regulations.  Final remarks are presented  in 
section 4, followed by two appendices, one containing the proofs and the other a numerical 
example. 
2  The Model 
The model adopted in this paper comprises four elements.  First, there is an entrepreneur 
(firm) with an investment project, but without the necessary funds to finance it. (In sub- 
section 3.3, I discuss the implications for the results of  this model if there were many firms.) 
Second, there is a bank, which  chooses  its capital structure and the contract used  to fi- 
nance the project.  Third, there is the deposit insurance provider, which charges the bank 
a premium  and  commits to reimburse depositors  if  the bank fails.  Finally, there is the 
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equivalent to the risk-free  interest rate. 
The crucial features of  the model are the nature of the relationships between the bank 
and the entrepreneur on the one hand, and between the bank and the provider of deposit 
insurance on the other hand.  The relationship  between  the bank  and the entrepreneur 
is characterized  by  a  principal-agent  problem, where the bank is  the principal  and the 
entrepreneur the agent.  The moral hazard in this part of  the model is generated  by  the 
dependence of  the project's  returns on  the entrepreneur's  effort, which is not observable. 
With respect to the relationship between the bank and the provider of  deposit insurance, 
it is assumed that the bank does not take into account, ex ante, how its actions affect the 
insurance premium it must pay.  A possible explanation for this behavior is that the bank 
views itself as a small unit of the banking sector, and it assumes the insurance premium to 
be determined by  the risk of  the whole banking sector rather than by  the risk of  its own 
assets. 
The assumptions of the model are as follows: 
Assumption 1  There is a risk-neutral  entrepreneur with an investment project,  but with- 
out the necessary funds  to finance  it.  The project  requires  a fixed  initial investment equal 
to 7, and produces  one period  later the total return y;  with probability  p;.  The number of 
possible  returns of  the project  is  finite.  In particular,  I assume that it has only three possible 
returns: 
Yo  < Y1  < 512, 
where yo = 0 and y = {y,, y2). 
The probability  distribution of  the project's  returns is assumed to be an endogenous 
variable because it depends on the entrepreneur's  effort.  Moreover, it is also assu~ned  that 
the entrepreneur incurs a cost for each level of  effort he chooses.  One way  to model this 
situation would be to take the entrepreneur's effort as the choice variable.  In that case, it 
5 
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effort, and to define a cost function with effort as an argument. Instead, I use the approach 
where the choice variables are the probabilities themselves. Because the entrepreneur incurs 
a certain cost for each probability distribution he chooses, the cost function depends on the 
probabilities (p,,p2) with the convention that p,  = 1 -  C?==,  p;. The inain advantage of  this 
approach is that it avoids some of  the technical difficulties that frequently  appear when 
solving a principal-agent  pr~blem.~  In addition, the choice of a cost function that is strictly 
convex and strictly increasing in its arguments makes it possible to use convex progra~~l~~ling 
theory in solving the model. 
Assumption 2  Let  C(.) denote  the  cost function.  Then C(p) : p -+ R+, where p  = 
{pI,p2), and C(.) is C< strictly increasing, and satisfies the condition C(0) = 0. 171  partic- 
ular, I use the following  cost function: 
Assumption 3  The bank's  equityholders  are  risk-neutral.  The opportunity cost  of  the 
bank's  capital (r) is assu~z~ed  to be  larger than the risk-free  iwterest rate  (i)  because  of, for 
example,  a tax on the bank's profits.  In accordance  with the actual capital regulation, the 
bank  must satisjjj  a minimum capital-asset  ratio, where the assets are  weighted  accordi7~g 
to their risky5  that is: 
where K  is the bank's capital and 8  is the required capital-asset  ratio. 
4For a discussion of  the advantages of  this approach, see HolmstrGm (1979). 
51n line with the Basle Agreement, I  assume that bank's  investment in is treated, for the purpose of 
capital regulation, in the same way  as the loan it gives to the firm.  However, some countries have adopted 
the requirement that banks finance such investments solely with capital. 
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arnount of deposits, provided  it is paid  the certainty equivalent to the risk-free  interest rate. 
One way to satisfy this condition is to have the bank pay  this interest rate on deposits and 
to hold deposit insurance, which will compensate depositors if the bank fails. 
2.1  The First-Best  Outcome 
The first-best  outcoine would be the solution to the model if there were no sources of  inoral 
hazard, or if  the entrepreneur had enough funds to finance the project. In both cases, this 
outcome would be the solution to the following problem: 
where nib  is the entrepreneur's first-best  profits and e is a vector of  ones. 
Because the objective function is C2  and strictly concave in p, and the feasible set is 
convex and compact, we  are in  the presence of  a  convex programming problem.  In  this 
case, we  know that there is a unique optiinu~n  and that the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions are 
necessary and sufficient for a solution. 
Assuming that the entrepreneur is not able to completely eliminate the risk of  failure of 
the project, that is, pib > 0, then the first-best  outcome to this model is 
H  - 
IIfEb = --1(1  + r), 
2 
This solution implies some restrictions for the parameters of  the   nod el.  First, because 
we are working with probabilities, it is necessary to make sure that their values are positive 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfand smaller than one. Second, because of the initial assunlption that the entrepreneur is not 
able to eliminate the risk of  failure of the project, we need to have pfb +  pib < 1. Finally, in 
order for this project to be undertaken, it is necessary that its first-best  profits are positive, 
that is, IILb > 0. 
These restrictions are summarized in the following assumption: 
Assumption  5 
YI  < al,  0 < y2-a3 < a,, 
a1 (~2  -  a,) + a2y, < a1a2, 
2.2  The Second-Best  Outcome 
When the entrepreneur gets the necessary funds to finance his project from an outside source 
(in this model, a bank), the following question can be raised:  What are the characteristics 
of the optimal contract that will rule their relationship? Given that the effort chosen by the 
entrepreneur is not observable, and that at the beginning of the period the bank will supply 
a fixed amount of funds equal to 7 (because by assumption the entrepreneur has no funds), 
then the only thing left to be defined by the contract is the payment that the entrepreneur 
will make to the bank at the end of  the period.  This payment will be contingent  on the 
observable inforination at that time, that is, the income of  the project. 
Let r;  be the payment required  by  the bank contingent  on  the return y;.  Due to the 
limited liability  condition,  we  have ro = 0, since by  assumption yo = 0, and r;  5 y;  for 
i = 1,2. Based on this definition, the contract between the two parties can be written as 
(I,  r), where I is the number of monetary units supplied by the bank and r is the vector of 
(non-negative) contingent payments made by the entrepreneur. 
The optimal contract and the bank's optimal capital structure are given by  the solution 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfto the following problem: 
y2 -  as -  r, -  a2p2  = 0 
0lr;ly;  for  i=1,2 
K+B=I  rr  2  e1 
p,Max (0, -QB) + C:=lp;~ax (0, r; -  QB)  -  K(l + r) 2  II,, 
where Q = [(I + i) + q];  q is the insurance premium, which the bank assumes independently 
of  its actions; B are the bank's  deposits; and IIB are the profits demanded by  the bank to 
finance the project, which can be any value between zero (representing the case where there 
is perfect conipetition ainong banks to finance this firm) and IIga" (representing the case 
where the bank behaves like a monopolist). 
The two linear constraints included  in  that problem  are the entrepreneur's  incentive 
constraints. They are the first-order conditions to the following problem: 
Max  TIE = C:=l  p;(y; -  r;) -  C(p) 
P 
s.t.  pe 5 1 
P>O' 
where r; are the payments demanded by  the bank.  The importance of  these constraints 
results from the impossibility of  observing the entrepreneur's  effort, which  determines p. 
Through them  the bank  motivates  the entrepreneur  to choose  (voluntarily)  the proper 
probability  distribution. 
In  the process  of  finding the optimal contract  and  the bank's  capital  structure, the 
following observations  are taken into account.  First, the problem  is solved under the as- 
sumption that the bank's  probability of  failure is p,,  that is, r;  > &*B*  for i = 1'2. As 
a result, once the solution has been  found, it is  necessary to ensure that it  satisfies this 
condition. 
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to be independent of its actions, the model is solved assuming q fixed at a certain level, q. 
Once the solution has been found, q is replaced with its fair price in order to determine the 
equilibrium.6 
Proposition 1 The optimal contract to the problem defined here is (I,  r*), where 
with:  First, Q*  [(l + i) + q*], and q* being the smaller root to the following  equation: 
where V2  >O, V,:O  and& > 0. 
1 -p* 
Second, f (p*) =  ,  where p* is the Lagmnge multiplier associated with the bank's 
1 -  2p* 
participation constraint.  It is defined as  p* = - - -  Wk*)  with 
2  2  w(q.1-  4[1r'*(i  + T) + n,] 
2 
[Y~  -  &*B*I2  [y2 -  a, -  Q*B*]  w (q*) =  + 
a1  a2 
Finally, the bank's  capital structure is 
For a sketch of the proof of this proposition, the values of V,,  and the equilibrium insurance 
premium (q*), see appendix A. 
Using the results in this proposition, it is possible to compute the second-best  probability 
'The  fair  price  is  the premium  that the deposit insurance provider  must  charge in  order to get  zero 
profits.  With probability p,*, the bank fails. In this state, the insurance provider gets nothing and must pay 
B*(l  +  i).  With  roba ability  (p: +p:), the insurance provider gets pB*  and pays nothing.  In equilibrium its 
P*  profits are zero if p,*B8(l  +  i)  = (p: +  P:)~*B*,  which implies a fair price equal to L(l  +  i). 
P: +  P: 
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Comparing these results with  the first-best  outcome, we  observe that, as expected,  the 
entrepreneur now  chooses a lower level of  effort in both states where the project produces 
a positive outcome, that is, p:  < p;'b and pl < pib. As  a result, the project's  probability 
of failure, which is also the bank's  probability of  failure, is now larger than the equivalent 
first-best  value (p," > pib). 
2.3  Debt and Equity as Optimal Contracts 
The optimal contract found in the previous section was not characterized in terms of the fi- 
nancial instruments known in the corporate finance literature. However, taking into account 
the equityholders' limited liability condition, it is possible to prove that such a contract can 
be spanned by  a combination of  debt  and equity, which  shows the optimality of  these fi- 
nancial instruments in the model adopted here. 
Suppose the bank uses debt and/or equity to finance the investment project. Then the 
new  contract  can be written  as (I,a,d), where I is the amount of  funds supplied by  the 
bank to the entrepreneur at the beginning of  the period, a is the proportion of  the firm's 
equity held by  the bank, (1 -  a)  is the proportion held by the firm's entrepreneur, and d is 
the face value of  debt borrowed by the firm. As usual, I assume that equityholders are the 
residual claimants and that they are protected by  limited liability. 
Proposition 2  Tlze  optimal contract for the problem presented here can be  replicated  by  a 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfurzique conzbination of  debt  and  equity, that is, by  the contract (I,  cr*,d*), wlzere 
and Q*  and B* are equal to the values defined in  proposition  (1). 
For proof of  this proposition, see appendix A. 
Note  that, in order to make econo~nic  sense, the results in proposition (2) require the 
following additional assumption on the parameters of  the model. 
Assumption 6 
Y2 -  a3 -  Y1 > 0. 
The intuition on why  a combination of  debt and equity spans the optimal contract is 
detailed in Santos (1995).  It is based on the following explanation:  The debt co~rlponent 
of  the contract is explained by  the constant marginal cost  of  the entrepreneur's  effort in 
state 2, that is, a,.  Its existence is necessary in order to avoid penalizing the entrepreneur 
relatively more in this state than in state 1. With respect to the equity component of  the 
contract, its presence is justified  by the difference of  the project's  returns across states. Its 
existence is important so that the entrepreneur is not relatively  more penalized in state I, 
which has a lower return. 
Looking at the contract defined in proposition (2), we see that the financial instruments 
used by the bank to finance the firm (debt and equity) depend on the bank's capital structure 
(mix of  deposits and capital).  In other words, the moral hazard due to deposit insurance 
eliminates the known  result  of  the separation between  the bank's  asset  composition  and 
its capital structure.'  The nature of  the relationship existing between the two sides of  the 
 o or a discussion about the separation of the bank's asset composition and its capital structure, see Klein 
(1971), Hart and Jaffee (1974), Szego (1980), and Sealey (1985). 
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subsection 3.1. 
3  Bank  Capital and Equity Investment Regulations 
As  mentioned before,  the efficiency  costs of  the two  sources of  moral hazard  present  in 
the model are translated in a lower level of effort chosen by  the entrepreneur, implying a 
higher probability of  failure for the project.  Regulators  cannot affect  the efficiency  costs 
caused by the moral hazard existing in the bank-entrepreneur  relationship, because these 
costs are originated  by  an asymmetric information  problem,  which  cannot be alleviated 
by regulation.  But what about the efficiency costs originated by the moral hazard due to 
deposit insurance? Is it possible to reduce them through regulation? 
This is the subject of the remainder of the paper.  In particular, two pieces of regulation 
are addressed here:  banks7 capital-asset  ratio requirement, and the regulation  that limits, 
and in some countries forbids, banks7 investments in the equity of  nonfinancial firms to a 
certain proportion of the firms' capital. 
Looking at the results in proposition (I), we  see that the revenue of  the contract used 
by the bank to finance the entrepreneur depends on the relative market power held by each 
of  these elements in its own sector. At one extreme, we have the case where there is perfect 
competition among banks to finance the project,  that is,  IIB = 0, and the entrepreneur 
gets all the surplus of  the project. At the other extreme, we have the case where the bank 
behaves  like  a monopolist, that is,  Il,  = IIga",  and the entrepreneur  gets at least  the 
minimum he requires to undertake the project, which by assumption is zero. 
Before we move to the analysis of the regulations in each market structure, it is important 
to take into account the following observation.  Using the incentive constraints derived in 
1  12 
subsection  2.2,  it is possible  to write the entrepreneur's  profits  as  Il,  = -alp: + 5a2p2. 
2 
Given that it is not optimal for the bank to motivate the entrepreneur to choose p, = p,  = 0 
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bank  behaves like  a  monopolist,  the entrepreneur's  participation  constraint  will  not be 
binding, that is, II,  > 0.  As a result, the problem can be solved without imposing such a 
constraint. 
Because  this  result  simplifies  the problern  studied here-in  particular,  it  allows  the 
finding of  explicit analytic solutions for all  of  the endogenous variables-in  the next two 
subsections the regulations are studied for the case where the bank behaves like a monopo- 
list. In subsection 3.3, the same regulations are studied for the case where there is perfect 
competition, but this time using a numerical example.  As  we  will  see, the major conclu- 
sions regarding the impact  of  both regulations  on  the bank's  stability  and their welfare 
implications do not depend on the market structure existing in the banking sector. 
3.1  Bank Capital Regulation 
When the bank behaves  like a monopolist, it captures the surplus of  the project and, as 
was explained in the previous subsection, the entrepreneur's participation constraint is not 
binding.  In this case, it is possible to show that the equilibrium is given by the results in 
1 
proposition (1) when  p*  = -m,  which implies in the limit f(p*)  = -, and8 
2 
As stated before, the efficiency costs due to both sources of  rnoral hazard are translated in 
lower probabilities of positive outcomes (p;'  < pib,  for i = 1,2),  implying a higher probability 
of failure for the project (p,* > p,lb), which is also the bank's probability of  failure. 
Most of  the literature that has studied the impact of  mispriced  deposit insurance has 
identified  banks'  risk-shifting  effect  with their decision to finance risky instead of  safe in- 
'The  same results would  be found if  the bank's  profits  were  maximized subject  to the entrepreneur's 
incentive constraints, the bank's budget constraint, and the capital-asset  ratio requirement. 
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effect occurs through a different channel.  It is inanifested in the bank's  adjustinent of  the 
contract it uses to finance the entrepreneur in a way that motivates hiin to adopt a riskier 
behavior, which in turn implies an increase in the risk of  the bank's  assets.  Thus, even if 
banks do not change their portfolio of customers, they can still take advantage of the deposit 
insurance subsidy by changing the way they do business with their current customers. 
What is the impact of  the capital regulation under these circumstances?  If  the bank 
had taken into account how the insurance premium it pays is determined, that is, if  there 
were no moral hazard due to deposit insurance, the bank's profits would be 
H  II,  = -  -  [(I -  8)(1+ i)  + 8(1+ r)]  7. 
4 
Under  these  circumstances,  since the bank's  asset  coinposition  is independent  froin  its 
capital structure, an increase in  the required  capital-asset  ratio (8) does not affect  the 
contract used by the bank. As such, it does not reduce the inefficiency of  the model caused 
by the moral hazard in the relationship between the bank and the entrepreneur, and it does 
not affect the entrepreneur's profits.  However, since this policy forces the bank to substitute 
capital for deposits (that is, it forces the bank to use relatively more of its most expensive 
source of funding-capital),  it implies a reduction in the bank's profits. 
When we  consider  the moral hazard due to deposit insurance,  the bank's  profits in 
equilibrium are 
Comparing (1) with.(2), we see that now an increase in the required capital-asset  ratio will 
have different implications. 
Proposition 3  An  increase in  the bank's required capital-asset  ratio implies 
(a) An improvement in the eficiency of  the model,  because its equilibrium gets closer to 
the first-best  outcome. 
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(c) An increase in the entrepreneur's profits  and, within a certain range,  an increase in 
the bank's profits,  in which case the regulation is Pareto-improving. 
For proof of  this proposition, see appendix A. 
The results in proposition (3) can be explained in the following way:  When the capital- 
asset  ratio is  increased, forcing  the bank  to substitute capital for  deposits,  there  is  an 
increase in the value of  what the bank's equityholders have at stake in case of bankruptcy. 
Moreover, given that the bank assumes the insurance premium it pays is independent of its 
risky behavior, it does not internalize any potential positive effects arising from this policy. 
As a result, in order to minimize its costs in case of failure, the bank adjusts the contract it 
uses to finance the entrepreneur in order to rnotivate him to choose a safer behavior.  This 
is implemented  through a reduction in  the importance (value) of  the financial instrument 
that is generally  more risk-motivating-debt.  This is why  the bank's  asset corrlposition 
becomes dependent on its capital structure, invalidating the separation result. 
The reduction  in  the payments  demanded  to the entrepreneur explains the increase 
in  both his  profits and his  effort.  This, in  turn, explains the reduction  in  the project's 
probability of failure and in  the bank's risk of failure, which was the reason for the bank to 
adjust its financing contract in  the first place. 
Finally, the increase in  the bank's  stability implies a reduction in  the equilibriurrl in- 
surance premium.  The savings  to the bank  of  this reduction  are what  differentiate  this 
situation from the case where there was no moral hazard due to deposit insurance. If  they 
outweigh the costs imposed  on the bank, because it must substitute capital for  deposits, 
then an increase in the required  capital-asset  ratio also implies an increase in the bank's 
profits (this relation is clear in the proof to proposition  [3]). Note that, because the reduc- 
tion  in  the equilibrium insurance premium  due to increases in the required capital-asset 
ratio occurs at a decreasing rate, eventually after a certain level of capital has been reached, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdffurther increases in the capital requirement will imply a decrease in the bank's profits. 
3.2  Bank Equity Investment Regulation 
As  explained  in  the introduction, countries in  which  banks are allowed  to invest  in the 
equity of nonfinancial firms frequently have a regulation limiting each of  these investments 
in terms of  either  the firm's  capital or its voting rights.  In the extreme, banks in some 
countries are not allowed to invest in such financial instrument at all. 
A frequent  argument used  to justify  this form  of  regulation is  that through it, the 
bank's involvement  with each firm is limited, reducing the bank's exposure to any major 
disturbances caused by a firm's bankruptcy and thus improving stability. This argument is 
problematic, because it does not consider all the implications of this form of regulation for 
the bank's role as a financial intermediary. In particular, it does not take into account that 
by limiting the bank's ability to finance a firm through equity, it also forces the bank to use a 
different financial instrument to supply funds that might be even more risk-motivating  than 
equity. As a result, the gains originated by the reduction of  the bank's  stake in the capital 
of the firm might be outweighed by  the costs of using the alternative financial instrument, 
in which case the final outcome of the regulation would be a perverse effect. 
In a similar procedure to that adopted for the study of capital regulation, this subsection. 
studies the implications for the model's efficiency and for the bank's stability of introducing 
a limit on the bank's  equity investment  defined in  terms of  the firm's  capital.  That is, 
the bank is not allowed  to hold  more than ii  percent of  the firm's  capital, where 15 = 0 
represents the countries in which banks are not allowed to invest in equity. 
According to proposition (2), if there were no equity investment regulation, the optimal 
decision for the bank to finance the firin would be to choose the combination (a*,  d*),  with 
Proposition 4  The introduction of  a limit on the bank's  investment in equity, defined  in 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfterms of  the firm's capital,  implies: 
(a)  A reduction in tihe  bank's  profits.  As such, the regulation is not Pareto-improving. 
(b)  No  improvemertt in the bank's  stability. 
For proof of this proposition, see appendix A. 
The results associated  with  the introduction of  the limit on the bank's  investlnent  in 
equity  are better  understood  if  the following two  effects of  this  form  of  regulation  are 
considered: First, because in this model equity is one of  the optimal financial instruments 
the bank uses to finance the firnl, restricting its use creates in itself a distortion.  Second, 
as was explained before, when the limit is introduced, in order to channel the same amount 
of funds to the firm, the bank must increase its use of another financial instrument. In this 
model, it increases the loan given to the firm, which is a contract that tends to be more 
risk-motivating  than equity. 
For  the case where the regulation is not very restrictive (that is, G is not substantially 
smaller than a*),  after its introduction the bank will hold the maximum investment in equity 
allowed by  the regulation (G) and will  demand a loan repayment & with d* < 2 < y,. The 
impact of the equity investment regulation here is, in addition to the results in proposition 
(4),  an increase in  the entrepreneur's profits and an improvement in the efficiency of  the 
model according to a first-order stochastic dominance criterion.  There is an increase in the 
probability of  the project's highest outcome (p,), a decrease in the probability of  its lowest 
positive outcome (p,), and no change in its probability of failure (p,). 
However, as the regulation becomes more restrictive (as ti  becomes smaller), the higher 
are the chances of  observing the bank  completely drop its use of  equity  and finance the 
firm through a loan with a face value larger than y,, in which case the regulation not only 
decreases the entrepreneur's profits and the model's efficiency (p,  decreases, p,  is now zero, 
and p,  increases), but it also has the perverse effect of increasing the bank's  risk of  failure. 
In sum, it is clear from this set of results that the form of equity investment regulation 
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improve the bank's stability. 
These results are substantially different from those obtained in subsection 3.1 regarding 
the capital regulation.  The fundamental reason for such a difference is that by increasing 
what the bank's  equityholders have at stake in case of bankruptcy, capital regulation de- 
creases their incentive to take advantage of  the deposit insurance subsidy.  However,  the 
form of  equity regulation addressed  here not only lacks this effect, but it also creates  a 
distortion against one of the optimal financial instruments used by the bank to finance the 
firm, which  also happens  to be the instrument  that is less risk-motivating.  As a  conse- 
quence, it is difficult  to justify  the introduction of  such a regulation on equity investments 
in a scenario where firms are strongly dependent on banks to raise external funds, and where 
the optimality of debt and equity contracts is driven by incentive effects. 
3.3  Additional Results 
The analysis conducted here assumes that there is only one investment project, and that 
the bank behaves like a monopolist.  This subsection studies the importance of  these as- 
sumptions for the results found in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. 
When we  have a  model  with  only  one investment  project,  what  results  are missing 
compared to the case of multiple projects?  Potentially, we  could miss the analysis of  the 
substitution effect, and we surely won't  be able to study the scale effect of the regulations. 
These effects are particularly  relevant  for  the analysis of  the capital regulation.  For 
example, the literature that has studied this regulation in multiple-project  frameworks has 
shown  that banks substitute safe for risky  investments in response to an increase in  the 
required capital-asset  ratio. 
In the model adopted here, even though the bank finances only one investment, we  are 
still able to capture the substitution effect  originated by  the regulations, because of  the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfendogeneity of  the contract used by  the bank  to finance the firm.  This effect, instead of 
being achieved through changes in the portfolio of  the bank's  investments, is implemented 
through the adjustment of  the contract used by  the bank, but the final result is identical. 
As observed in subsection 3.1, an increase in the capital regulation makes the bank change 
the financing contract in such a way that the entrepreneur is motivated to decrease the risk 
of his investment, implying a decline in the risk of  the bank's assets. 
With respect to the scale effect, the assumption of having only one project that requires 
a fixed investment imposes some limitations. However, it is still possible to use the results 
of this framework in order to understand the scale effect of  the capital regulation.  It seems 
clear that the impact on the number of projects financed by the bank due to an increase in 
the capital-asset  ratio requirement  will depend, on the one hand, on the bank's flexibility 
in raising additional capital and, on the other hand, on the relative size of  the gains that 
this regulation brings to the bank (the decrease in the insurance premium it has to pay) 
versus its costs (the cost  of  having to use relatively more of  its most expensive source of 
funding-capital).  Therefore, an increase in the capital regulation  will  not always imply 
a negative scale effect.  For  example, it is possible to show  through the model presented 
here that when there are many identical projects, if the cost of capital does not rise rapidly 
along with an increase in its demand, then we might observe an increase in the number of 
projects financed by the bank in response to an increase in the capital regulation. 
What about the assumption of the bank's  behaving like a monopolist?  Will the results 
change if  we  assume that the bank  behaves  as if  there were  perfect  competition in the 
banking sector? 
The main advantage of  using the monopoly assumption was  the possibility  of  finding 
explicit analytic solutions for all of  the endogenous variables of  the model.  This was pos- 
sible because the entrepreneur's participation  constraint was not binding and, as a result, 
was  ignored in solving the model.  When there is perfect competition among banks, this 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfsimplification can no longer be used  and, as a consequence, it becomes impossible to find 
explicit analytic solutions for all of  the endogenous  variable^.^ 
This precludes the study of the regulations in a way identical to that adopted in subsec- 
tions 3.1 and 3.2. Thus, the analysis had to be conducted through a numerical example. The 
parameters of  this example and the effects of  both regulations are in appendix B. Compar- 
ing them to the results found under a monopoly framework, we  see that capital regulation 
improves the bank's  stability and can be Pareto-improving  in both market structures.  In 
addition, when the bank behaves like a monopolist, we see that efficiency is clearly increased 
because of  the approximation of  the second-best  solution to the first-best  outcorne.  But, 
when  there is perfect  competition among banks, due to the decrease in the probability of 
the highest state (p:),  such approximation is only partial. 
Regarding the equity investment regulation, we  see that in both market  structures it 
is not Pareto-improving,  it does not improve the bank's  stability  (in fact, when  there is 
perfect  competition, the perverse effect is dominant), and it has the same mixed  effects in 
terrns of its impact on the efficiency of  the model. 
This set of  comparisons  confirms that the main conclusions  about the impact  of  the 
bank's capital and equity investment regulations hold both when there is a monopoly and 
when there is perfect competition in the banking sector. 
4  Final Remarks 
The risk-shifting  effect due to deposit insurance has usually been identified by banks' deci- 
sion to finance risky rather than safe investment projects. In the model presented here, this 
effect is manifested through a different channel. It occurs through the bank's adjustment of 
the financing contract it uses in a way that motivates the firm to adopt a riskier behavior, 
'NOW  we  need the entrepreneur's profits so that this function can be maximized subject to, among other 
things, the bank's participation  constraint. 
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comes dependent on the conditions under which  the bank operates-namely,  the existence 
of deposit insurance and the presence of regulations. 
Under these circumstances, capital regulation decreases the bank's incentives to iriotivate 
risky behavior by  the fir111 to which it supplies funds, because it forces  the bank to hold 
relatively more capital-the  funds it has at stake in case of bankruptcy.  Hence, in addition to 
the cost that this policy imposes on the bank (because it requires the bank to use relatively 
more of  its most expensive source of  funding-capital),  it also reduces  the moral hazard 
costs due to deposit insurance (because the equilibrium insurance premium is reduced). As 
a result, an increase in the capital requirement  reduces the bank's risk of failure, can be 
Pareto-iinproving,  and can also have a beneficial  effect on the efficiency of the model. 
Introducing a limit on one of  the optimal financial instruments a bank uses  to financ.e 
a firm not only creates a distortion against this instrument, but it also forces the bank to 
use alternative contracts in order to finance the firm.  This is what happens when firms 
depend  largely on  banks  to raise external funds, and when  the regulation  limits banks' 
equity investments in nonfinancial firms to a certain limit, defined in terms of  each fir~n's 
capital. 
In the model presented here, this type of regulation is not Pareto-improving,  and it does 
not improve the bank's  stability:  By limiting the bank's  ability to use equity to finance a 
firm, the regulator forces the bank to use more debt in order to channel the necessary funds 
to the firm. This offsets the effects of the reduction of the bank's  stake in the capital of the 
firm and, in some cases, it might  even create the perverse effect  of  increasing the bank's 
risk of failure because debt, in general, is more risk-motivating  than equity. 
How robust are these results?  Conducting the analysis in a framework where both debt 
and equity are optimal contracts introduced certain limitations because of the design of  the 
project held by the entrepreneur. Nonetheless, most of the results hold regardless of whether 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdfthere is a rnonopoly  or perfect coinpetition in the banking sector.  In aclclition, the results 
concur both  with  the literature on  banks'  capital  regulation  [see, for  example,  Furlong 
and Keeley  (1989)l  and with  the literature that has studied  the risk  effects  associated 
with  different  financial instruments-namely, that debt financing tends to be more risk- 
motivating than equity financing [see, for example, Pozdena (1991)]. 
It reinains a topic for future research to  study the impact of equity investment regulations 
when firms have access to capital markets, particularly to the stock market. 
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A  Proofs of Propositions 
A.l  Proof of Proposition 1 
For a given value  of  the insurance premium  (q),  the problem  defined  here can be solved 
through the following steps. First, because of  the assumption that capital is more expensive 
than deposits, we know that the bank chooses the minimuin required capital, that is, K* = 
91. Based on this and on the bank's  budget  constraint, we  know its demand for deposits, 
B* = (1 -  9)I. Second, using that information and the entrepreneur's incentive constraints, 
we can write both the bank's and the entrepreneur's profits in the probabilities.  Third, froin 
the first-order  conditions of the problem, we can find the optimal probabilities (p:,p:).  Since 
this is a convex problem, there is no need to consider the second-order  conditions. Fourth, 
using the values of pf,  through the entrepreneur's incentive constraints, it is possible to find 
rf, and through the definition of  the fair insurance premium, one can derive the second- 
degree equation in q* presented in the proposition, where 
V,  -  (1 +  i) {  a,a2 -  [u~[YI -  (1 -  O)~I+  a1[~2  -  s -  (1 -  9)f1] f (P*)}, 
v, -  {  (a,+az)(l-s)f-  [a,[?,,  -(1-9)f1+a1[~,-a3-(1-~)f1]}f(P*), 
% = (a, + a,)(l -  B)ff(~*). 
Note that Vo  > 0 because of  the conditions imposed by  the first-best  solution to the model 
[assu~nption  (5)], V,  > 0, and V,  :o.  In order to have an equilibrium, we need to have V,  < 0. 
In  this case, the equilibrium insurance premium is the smaller root  to the second-degree 
equation referred to above, because this root Pareto dominates the larger one.  Hence we 
have 
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Taking into account the equityholders7 liittited liability  condition, this proposition  can be 
shown through a spanning argument.  For a given percentage of  the firm's  capital held by 
the bank (Ci), and a given face value of  debt (d),  the entrepreneur must solve the following 
problem: 
Max  TIE = c:=,  p;(l -  Ci)(y; -  2) -  C(p) 
P 
s.t.  pe 5 1 
P>  0. 
This is a convex programming problem, so the usual results apply.  For the case where 
pi > 0 for i = 0,1,2, the incentive constraints are 
The idea of  the proof  is  to show first  that there exists a feasible  combination  of  cr 
and d that motivates each entrepreneur, through his incentive constraints, to choose the 
probability  distribution p*, in which  case  the initial  conditions  are verified  (p;  > 0 for 
i = 0,1,2), and second, that such a combination generates the same revenue to the bank as 
r* does. 
From  the incentive constraints and the second-best  probability  distribution p*, it is 
possible to find a*  and d*, that is, the values that the bank would have to choose in order 
to implement p*. Since these values satisfy the initial conditions, the last thing left  to be 
proved is that the coinbination (cr*,d*) generates the same revenue to the bank as r* does. 
This is apparent immediately once we  recognize that cr(y; -  d) + d = r;,  for i = 1,2, and 
we  take into account the equityholders7  limited liability condition in order to explain why 
in state 0 (the state where the project's outcome is equal to zero), the bank in a position 
as debtholder receives no payment from the firm's  equityholders. 
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Given that an increase in  the bank's required capital-asset  ratio implies a reduction in the 
equilibrium insurance premium  (q*), it is straightforward to show that both probabilities 
of the project's positive outcomes rise when 8 is increased.  This in turn implies an increase 
in the entrepreneur's profits  (TIE) and a decrease in the project's probability of failure (p:). 
The impact, in equilibrium, of  the capital regulation on the bank's  profits (TI:)  is given by 
From  here we  see what happens to the bank's  profits  when  there is  an increase in  the 
required capital-asset  ratio.  This implies a cost for the bank because it must use relatively 
more of  its most expensive source of funding-capital  [note that r > i by  assumption (3)]. 
But it also implies a positive effect for the bank-the  reduction of  the moral-hazard  costs 
dq*(e) < 0.  Whether the bank's  profits  caused  by  deposit insurance, which  is given by - 
d  e 
increase with that policy depends on the relative magnitude of  these two effects. 
A.4  Proof of  Proposition 4 
One way  of showing the results in this proposition is to derive all endogenous variables  as 
functions of a,  and then study the impact on  these variables of  a reduction in a. 
The problem that the bank must solve is 
There is  no need  to consider  here the entrepreneur's  participation  constraint because,  as 
previously explained, this constraint is not binding when the bank behaves like a monopolist. 
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to find the endogenous variables as functions of a,  the bank's problem is solved in two steps. 
In the first step, the optimal value of d is found assuming that a and q are constant.  In the 
second step, the first-order  c.ondition of  the first step is substituted in the bank's problem 
so that the optimal value of  a can be computed. 
The first-order  condition of first step is 
Using (A.5) and the entrepreneur's incentive constraints, one can compute the project's 
probabilities as functions of a. They are 
1 
= 2a1  (a, + a,) [p1,1 +  ~1,2~]  , 
where 
PI,, = (a1 + a2)[~1  -  Q(1 -  fl)J] -  a1(~2  -  a3 -  Y,), 
'1,2  =T  2a1(~2  -  yl), 
P2,1  = (al + a2)[y2  -  a, -  &(I -  8)f] + a2(y2 -  as -  y,), 
Pz,,  =.  2a2(yz -  -1). 
Since P,,, > 0 and P,,,  > 0, the equity regulation implies an increase in p2 and a decrease in 
p,. Furthermore, since p,  does not depend on a,  this regulation does not affect the bank's 
probability of failure and, as a result, has no impact on the equilibrium insurance premium. 
Through the same procedure, one can determine both the entrepreneur's and the bank's 
profits as functions of  a. They are 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9515.pdf1  n~(c-w)  =  [B, + B, a -  B2a2] -  Of  (1 + r), 
4ala2(a1  + a,) 
where 
2 
2  Eo = {a2[yI -  Q(1 -  e)f] + al[y2 -  a, -  Q(1 -  e)f]}  +  4a,a2(y2 -  a, -  yl) , 
El  = 8ala2(~2  -  y1)(y2 -  a, -  y,), 
E2  = 4a1az(~z  -  YI)~, 
and 
2  so  = {a2[y, -  Q(1 -  ~)f]  + a,[y2 -  a, -  Q(1 -  e)i]} , 
B1 = 4ala2(~2  -  y1)(y2 -  a, -  y,), 
B2  4a,a2(~2  -  ~1)~. 
Because the profits of  the entrepreneur are a decreasing, strictly convex function of  a 
in the relevant range, the equity investment  regulation implies an increase in the value of 
this function.  With respect to the bank's profits, note that they are an increasing, strictly 
concave function of  a with its maximum, as expected, at the point  where  c-w  = a* with 
1 
f(p*) = -. Thus, the introduction of  the equity limit implies a reduction in the bank's 
2 
profits. 
The results derived so far in this proof assume that the optimal value of  d, determined by 
(A.5) for a given maximum equity that the bank can hold. (6))  is smaller than y,. However, 
because there is an inverse relationship between d and 6, the smaller the value of  6 (the 
more restrictive the regulation), the higher the chances that d becomes larger than y,. In 
this case, depending on  the parameters of  the model, it may  be optimal for the bank  to 
co~npletely  drop its use of equity and begin financing the entrepreneur using only debt with 
a face value higher than y,.  Under these conditions, the entrepreneur chooses to put forth 
no effort in  state 1, which i~nplies  an increase in the bank's  probability of  failure and, as 
a result, an increase in the equilibrium insurance premium.  Note, however, that the bank 
does not take this into account, because it assumes that the insurance premium it pays is 
independent of  the risk of its assets. 
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The set of parameters chosen for the numerical example was 
The first-best  solution to the model with these parameters is 
The results for  the bank's  capital  and equity investment  regulations,  when  there is 
perfect competition among banks, are presented in the next two subsections. For the case of 
the capital regulation, subsection B.1, the equilibrium is given by the results in propositions 
(1) and (2) with  IT,  = 0.  The values of  the endogenous variables are plotted as functions 
of 8,  the required capital-asset  ratio. The impact of  an increase in the capital regulation is 
given by the variation in those variables when 8 is increased. 
With respect to the equity  investment regulation, subsection B.2, the equilibrium for 
each given value of 6 (the maximum stake of  the firm's  capital that the bank can hold) is 
determined by the face value of debt that the bank has to charge the firm, given the bank's 
zero-profit  condition, and its behavior with respect to deposit insurance. 
The values of  the endogenous variables are plotted  as functions of 6,  for the range of 
the nutnerical example where this limit is binding, that is, for 6 < a*.  The impact of the 
equity investment regulation is given by comparing the second-best  solution to the model 
with the values of these variables associated with a given value of 6. 
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pi  I 
For 8 = 0.08 : 
0.4809 1 
a  Represents the second-best  so- 
lution to the model. 
0.4786 
-  Represents the equilibrium for 
----------- 
0.4763 I--  each maximum stake of  the firm's  capi- 
I 
I 
I  tal that the bank is allowed to hold (2). 
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